hilosophers and logicians did not truly begin accepting relations until the nineteenth century. Even then, quite a battle ensued. Though Russell was one of the main philosophers arguing for the acceptance of relations, he still had a number of questions about exactly what a relation was. One of these questions focussed on whether or not a relation was a universal. In the manuscript the present paper is discussing, Russell's "Do DiTerences DiTer?" (hereafter, ddd), 1 he argues that relations could not be universals. Rather, relations were particular to the things related; they were speciWc (or, as he sometimes puts it, "particularized"). They could not be shared. And, Russell was not alone with such a view. His position on speciWc ("particularized") relations of ddd is reXected in the view of his philosophical colleague, G.yE. Moore, who wrote: "Only particular instances of … [diTerence] … alone can relate." 
This paper examines one of Russell's views, held about the turn of the century, found in a short, unpublished manuscript entitled "Do DiTerences DiTer?". This work was one of Russell's early attempts to focus solely on the issue of whether relations were universalz or speciWc relations. Written before The Principles of Mathematics, the manuscript can serve as a step toward that work. To provide a framework for our discussion, we look at aspects of his yet earlier views on this matter. In discussion of the manuscript itself, the present paper divides "Do DiTerences DiTer?" into four distinct parts, discusses some issues and problems with its view, and ends with four distinct responses by Russell to its view.
i P hilosophers and logicians did not truly begin accepting relations until the nineteenth century. Even then, quite a battle ensued. Though Russell was one of the main philosophers arguing for the acceptance of relations, he still had a number of questions about exactly what a relation was. One of these questions focussed on whether or not a relation was a universal. In the manuscript the present paper is discussing, Russell's "Do DiTerences DiTer?" (hereafter, ddd), 1 he argues that relations could not be universals. Rather, relations were particular to the things related; they were speciWc (or, as he sometimes puts it, "particularized"). They could not be shared. And, Russell was not alone with such a view. His position on speciWc ("particularized") relations of ddd is reXected in the view of his philosophical colleague, G.yE. Moore, who wrote: "Only particular instances of … [diTerence] … alone can relate." Psychology (1901; repr. Kessinger Publishing, 2007) , 2: 406. 3 We do have a background assumption that items A, B, C, and Dz are four in number.
4 "Fundamental Ideas and Axioms of Mathematics" (1899), Papers 2: 222-305. 5 Though this was written before Russell had fully articulated his paradox, some of the kinds of concerns which led to that discovery are here. 6 Such superscript notation will here designate speciWc relations.
Russell's ddd provides an interesting step towards his position in The Principles of Mathematicsz and later. As this paper will show, a fair portion of the Principlesz ' text on universals and particularized relations can be seen as a response to ddd.
Earlier views on speciWc relations
Before writing ddd, Russell had already made a number of statements claiming that relations that relate are speciWc to their terms. One early argument for relations (and properties) being speciWc relied on their being locatable. Just like the redness-here had to be diVerent from the rednessthere, so too the relation of, say, Az 's-being-a-mile-from-B, had to be diTerent from that of Cz z 's-being-a-mile-from-D. It quickly became clear that there were a number of important relations which did not Wt such a model, and he looked for other arguments for speciWc relations. 3 One such line of reasoning Russell then adopted can be seen in his "Fundamental Ideas and Axioms of Mathematics" 4 where we Wnd statements such as: "It is absolutely necessary to regard a relation between two terms as … diTering from any relation which can hold between a diTerent pair" (Papers 2: 295). For Russell, such "necessity" was found in examples like the following: "'Diversity diTers from A.' Here the diversity which occurs as relation cannot be related to that which occurs as term, and therefore, by symmetry, not to A either" (Papers 2: 287; emphases added). Here we Wnd Russell concerned with the case of one item-in this case a relation-playing multiple logical roles within a given proposition, as Dz z (D, Az ).
5 To take care of this kind of case, Russell insists on speciWc diTerences occurring as the relating relation, or D DA (D, Az ). For Russell, an answer must come in terms that do not pose some paradox of analysis. With these assumptions, this question, and this restriction placed upon an appropriate answer, we may now begin to look at that manuscript. ddd begins with Russell asking: "Does the diTerence between red and blue diTer from the diTerence between identity and diTerence?" (Papers 3: 555) . This is Russell's attempt to introduce the general question as to whether a (relating) relation is to be treated as a universal relation or as a speciWc relation.
Part of this opening question, viz., "the diTerence between identity and diTerence", is similar to the above-quoted "diversity diTers from Az " of his earlier argument in that each is a case where one item (viz., "diTerence") seems to be playing two roles within each proposition, the roles of (relating) relation and of relatum (term). So, in writing the opening sentence of his manuscript, Russell clearly has one of his earlier ways of arguing for speciWc relations on his mind. However, that past kind of argument was not what moved this work along. Rather, in his writing of ddd, Russell wants the argument for speciWc relations notz to rely on such examples as "diTerence between identity and diTerence". He wants a case where he feels he could safely generalize his results, and, in ddd, he believes that he has found just that. As we shall see, Russell himself later raises questions about both this approach and its results.
Russell approaches answering the above opening question about the nature of a relating relation (which, for most of this work, is that of DiTerence) by setting forth three hypotheses:
(1) When a and b are distinct, between them is the abstract relation of DiTerence, a universal-identical across any context in which it occurs. (2) When a and b are distinct, there are two relations between them: a universal relation of DiTerence, shareable with pairs other than a and b; and a speciWc relation of diTerence, particular to the pair a and b. (3) When a and b are distinct, their relation of diTerence is speciWc to them, had by no other pair; while DiVerence itselfz (the "universal") does not function as a relation at all (as the universal did in (1) and (2)), but rather as a class-concept for all speciWc diTerences.
Russell argues for (3), adopting speciWc ("particularized") relations as the only ones that can relate. Though he has introduced three hypotheses, the paper's focus is on a comparison of universal with speciWc relations.
iii
In laying out the details of ddd, we want here to present four distinct matters: Wrst, ddd's argument againstz universal relations; second, ddd's argument for speciWc relations; third, an important concern of Russell's in ddd; and, fourth, ddd's general conclusion. In the last section of this paper, we will talk about four eventual responses of Russell to ddd.
1.wddd's argument against universal relations
The argument may be represented as follows:
A. All relational propositions have a meaning. B. The meaning of the proposition expressed by "A and B diTer" is not (what Russell will call) "inadmissibly complex". C. Relations are either speciWc, i.e., particular to just one set of terms; or, they are universal, i.e., they may relate more than one set of terms. D. If a relation is taken to be universal, then the meaning of the relational proposition expressed by "A and Bz diTer" will be (paradoxically) "inadmissibly complex".
And, Russell would conclude that:
E. Relations are speciWc and not universal.
In the ddd manuscript itself, the main thrust of Russell's argument against relations being universal is to argue for the truth of D above. Since this necessity arises from the analysis of the proposition, the relation of diVerence to A and Bz must be part of the meaningz of "A diTers from Bz". But now the question arises whether this relation (which we will call Rz) is the same as that which holds between diTerence and any other pair of related terms. (Papers 3: 556) Russell is here asking: Is this new relation, "Rz ", which is needed for the meaning of our initial proposition, "Dz (a, bz )", speciWc to DiTerence and A and Bz ; or is it-like the hypothesis about DiTerence itself-a universal? Russell reasons that, since Rz must be a universal (according to hypothesis (1)), then:
… the analysis of our proposition now appears as "A, B, diTerence, Rz". But the same reasons which compelled us to introduce Rz will compel us to introduce a new relation RzN between A and B and diTerence [and Rz] .
(Papers 3: 556)
The "and Rz " portion was left out of the manuscript. One must assume this is what Russell meant to render cogent his immediately following claim: "Thus we shall be led on to an endless regress … to greater and greater complexities in the meaningz of our original proposition. And this kind of regress is certainly inadmissible" (Papers 3: 556). Here we have come to the work's conclusion that if a relating relation is universal, then the meaning of a proposition in which it occurs will be "inadmissibly complex". Russell seems to be arguing that, if a proposition's relating relation is universal, then to obtain the meaningz of that initial relational proposition, one must proceed on an unending search of relations of greater and greater complexity, which is clearly inadmissible. And, since it was the universal relation which led to this diUculty, and this is common to hypotheses (1) and (2), Russell concludes with his hypothesis (3), viz., that relations must be speciWc. However, one must be careful here. For surely the discovery of a problem with hypotheses (1) and (2) does not mean that hypothesis (3) is thereby "safe". Can we not employ the same argument against speciWc relations as well? Aware of this possibility, Russell notes that a "speciWc diTerence is related to A and Bz " (Papers 3: 556; emphasis added). And when he says this, he is not merely reminding us that Dz ab (a, bz ). Rather, he is saying that there is some further relation between the speciWc relation Dz ab and a and b. So, why not bring in this new diTerent relation-just as he did in the previous argument against hypothesis (1)? Since there are regresses with both universal and speciWc relations, why are not both harmful? Russell answers that in the case of a speciWc relation (hypothesis (3)), for any such further relation R, it would not form any part of "the meaning of the proposition 'A and B diTer', so that the resulting regress is of the harmless variety" (Papers 3: 556). So, Russell's claim is that while in each case-universal and speciWc relations-there will be a regress, it is only with universal relations that this is a problem. For only there does a regress involve the meaningz of the original proposition. But why does the speciWc relation answer the question about the proposition's meaning, while the universal relation did not? The answer to this question brings in the other ddd argument.
2.wddd's argument for speciWc relations
To make this argument clear, it will help to introduce a notion of "meaning" that Russell held in the earlier "Fundamental Ideas and Axioms of Mathematics"-a notion that is well captured in his characterization of "predication":
The peculiarity of the relation of predication, which makes it scarcely a relation, is that the second concept does not occur as term, but only as meaning. In relations of other kinds, both concepts occur as terms, and only the relation occurs as meaning. (Papers 2: 276) This belief-that in a standard relational proposition it is only the relating relation that "occurs as meaning"-will guide him in ddd as well. So, when reasoning about a relational proposition's "meaning", Russell will focus primarily on the relation in that proposition. We may thus think of Russell as arguing: given that the analysis of "Dz (a, bz )" is [D, a, bz ] , the entity of that analysis which "occurs as meaning" will be found in its relation, D. For Russell, this relation can be only a universal relation or speciWc relation. Let us consider each again:
1. Supposing D to be a universal, could it alone be what "occurs as meaning" in the proposition expressed by "Dz (a, bz )"? Since, qua universal, D alone would not be unique to the proposition under consideration, clearly it would not. What if we connected the members of this set? Such a connection could provide us with a relation, something Russell says "occurs as meaning". That is, is the meaning of "Dz (a, bz )" to be found in the relation R of "Rz (D, a, bz )"? No, because if-to discover the meaning of "Dz(a, bz )"-one has to analyze the proposition "Rz (D, a, bz )", then, since R would be a universal just like D, it would not work, and we would have to analyze "R 1 (R, D, a, bz )" for R 1 as well, and it would not stop here. This, of course, is a diTerent way of looking at Russell's regress, that non-ending search for the proposition's meaning. 2. On the other hand, under the supposition that the relating relation of "Dz (a, bz )" is a speciWc relation, and not a universal relation, diTerent things seem to occur. Can we count the speciWc relation D ab (the-D-of-a-and-bz ) as occurring as the meaning of Dz (a, bz )? In ddd, Russell thinks we can. The speciWc relation D ab (the-D-of-a-and-bz ) diTers from the universal in being unique to the proposition under analysis ("Dz (a, bz )"), and so it avoids the diUculties that occurred with the universal relation. That unending series of questions about which relation occurs as the meaning of the initial proposition never gets started.
Russell wants the meaning of a proposition to be unique to it yet diTerent from it. Since Dz ab is a relation which is unique to the proposi-tion, Russell thinks it fulWlls that requirement. Russell also argues that the speciWc relation is unanalyzable: "The hypothesis (3) demands that the diTerence of A and Bz should be strictly unanalyzable. It is only thus that it escapes the condemnation which was passed on (1) and (2)" (Papers 3: 557; emphasis added). It is thus-through this unanalyzability-that its very diTerence from the proposition (which isz analyzable) is established. And thus, this requirement for meaning is obtained. So, while there are regresses in both cases, there is no regress involving meaning with the speciWc relation, as there seemed to be with the universal. This comparison of relational kinds and their regresses is the backbone of Russell's argument in ddd.
3.wA concern
Russell also has an important background concern supporting his adoption of speciWc and not universal relations. This is our (commonsense) understanding that there are (many) diTerences. While not an argumentz found in ddd, Russell does note that relations being universals would entail that "the plural diVerences is a mistake" (Papers 3: 555). If there were only one diTerence (the universal), how could there be diTerent (many) diTerences? Though this common-sense truth-that there are many diTerences-is clearly in the back of his mind, he seems to want to show how we can account for such matters without an appeal to common sense, but through philosophical arguments involving "meaning". Though in the background of ddd, it is clear how such a concern must have made speciWc relations initially more attractive. We will see how this concern becomes very important in Russell's later conception of the correct way of thinking about speciWc relations.
4.wddd's conclusion
It's important to single out one of Russell's conclusions because of the role it plays in his later thought. Russell states several conclusions-some particular to the case at hand, viz., diTerence: "When two terms diTer, they have … a speciWc diTerence … not shared by any other pair of terms" (Papers 3: 556). And from this, Russell thinks he may draw the following conclusion: "Any relation which actually relates two terms must be incapable of relating any others" (Papers 3: 557). And, it is this more general conclusion, not the earlier one, which leads the ddd view into trouble for Russell.
iv
In this section on ddd, we Wrst discuss the relation Russell proposes between a speciWc relation of diTerence and the abstract class-concept DiTerence; and we then summarize our Wndings on his notion of speciWc relations.
First: Russell characterizes each (speciWc) diTerence's relation to the class-concept DiTerence as follows: "DiTerence itself is not a relation, in the sense that there are no terms which it relates; it is a class-concept to which diTerences are relatedz as redness to colour" (Papers 3: 556; emphasis added). Or, more brieXy, "DiTerence in the abstract relates nothing, but is related to diTerences as Point to points" (Papers 3: 557). This relation (italicized above) is often called the "instance-of" relation, a terminology Russell himself sometimes employs.
In ddd, Russell says that with speciWc relations "… there is only one proposition in which any … relation relates" (Papers 3: 557). And, with the proposition "A is diTerent from Bz ", let us designate its one relation of speciWc diTerence as "Dz ab z " and represent this relating by Dz ab (a, bz ). Russell continues by saying: "though there are … others in which it is related" (Papers 3: 557 Remember Russell's background worry about such statements as "DiTerence diTers from Identity"-statements where the same item was serving as both relation and term in one proposition. In order to stay away from the worrisome statement-form of "Dz (D, =)", we may use the above discussion to model this statement as the conjunction "D
In such a statement, while we still have the same thing (D D= ) serving as both relation and term, it is in diTerent conjuncts that it occurs. So, even though in Russell's ddd argument for speciWc relations no sentence such as that conjunction was ever employed, Russell may well have considered this useful for handling his background concern. In this paper's last section, we shall see both how this relation of "instance-of" leads the ddd Conclusion into trouble, and how this relating-one-place/related-others pattern leads the ddd Argument forz Spec-iWc Relations into trouble.
To summarize the ddd view, when Russell claims that relations are speciWc (or "particularized"), what exactly is he claiming? What is a speciWc relation? Considering just the speciWc relation: the-diVerence-of-A-and-B, Russell's answer would be the following: (i) That there is a relation R, such that (ii) R holds between a and b, and (iii) R is a DiTerence, an instance of the concept DiTerence, and (iv) R is speciWc ("particular") to just the terms a and b, and (v) R has no constituents; it is simple and not analyzable.
Using the symbol "Dz " for the class-concept DiTerence, "Iz z " for the instance-of relation, and "Cz z " for the is-a-constituent-of relation, we may state the above as:
This "Rz " is what we have been representing as "Dz ab z ". One of the several problems about Russell's view is the above occurrence of "Rz (a, bz )", or R holdsz between a and b. Our next section will discuss this point.
v
In this section we present several issues arising out of Russell's ddd argument and its resulting view. These include: Wrst, the idea of a "relating relation"; second, the very possibility of a false meaningful relational proposition; and, third, a problem, involving what we will call the list and non-list propositions.
To begin: there are at least two ways in which the expression "relating relation" can be used. For one, a "relating relation" could simply refer to the function of a relation in a proposition, when it occurs as a relation and not as a term. This notion, a matter of a proposition's form, is how we have used and will continue to use this expression. Also, however, a "relating relation" could refer to a relation which is actually relating. This would bring in the notion of truth. These diTerences may be illustrated by considering two propositions: "A is bigger than Bz ", and "B is bigger than Az ". In the Wrst sense, the relation of being-bigger-than would count as a "relating relation" in each of these; in our second sense, however, it would be a "relating relation" in at most one of them. In ddd, this distinction is not noted; this is because of an apparent collapse of meaningfulness and truth.
When Russell Wnally concludes in ddd that there are speciWc diTerences, he says:
… that the meaning of "A and B diTer" is "There is a speciWc diTerence which relates A and Bz"; in other words, "There is a concept diTerence of A and Bz." (Papers 3: 556; 1st emphasis added)
By this, Russell is equating the following:
(i) There is a speciWc diTerence which relates A and B, with (ii) There is a concept diTerence-of-A-and-B.
Note the following:
1. For Russell, the meaning of the proposition, "A and B diTer" is the speciWc concept, diTerence-of-A-and-B. 2. This concept, itself an instance of DiTerence, actually relates A and B (see (i) above), or, in Russell's later language, subsists between A and B. Such, however, is exactly what makes a proposition true. 3. So, relational propositions with meaning are true. Does this mean that a false proposition is without meaning? Consider some false relational proposition Rz (a, bz ). Is there a speciWc relation R-ofa-and-b, or Rz ab z ? On the one hand, if there is, then, according to the manuscript's above doctrine, this relation has to hold, the proposition thus being true. On the other hand, if there is no speciWc relation when the proposition is false, then, since (in this work at least) these relations are the bearers of the complete proposition's meaning, false relational propositions are going to be meaningless. But this is surely inconsistent with the understanding that meaningful propositions can be either true or false.
Another way of putting this point is to remember that Russell (in hypothesis (3) of ddd) characterized the speciWc relation of A-and-Bz 'sdiTerence as being an instance of the class-concept DiTerence. We have to note that, whenever some speciWc relation of diTerence is an instance 7 "Meinong's Theory of Complexes and Assumptions", Mind, 1904; Papers 4: 432-74 (at 453). of the class-concept DiTerence, then the proposition expressing that such a relation does hold will have to be true. And this feature holds for any speciWc relation. Put diTerently, try to consider the false relational proposition, Dz (c, dy). If its speciWc relation, Dz cd , were an instance of the classconcept DiTerence, that would make Dz (c, dy) true and not false. In eTect, there seems to be no logical "room" for a false relational proposition with ddd's hypothesis (3), that aforementioned collapse of meaningfulness and truth. Later, in his long article on Meinong, Russell himself realizes this, making a similar point: "If what is actually meant by a relational proposition is the being of a particularized relation, then, when the proposition in question is not true, it must be meaningless.…" 7 We will introduce our next problem by focussing on some logical facts. Again, taking Russell's "A and Bz diTer" as represented by "Dz (a, bz )", we note that it would entail the proposition expressed by:
However, no such entailment goes the other way. On the other hand, while "Dz (a, bz )" also entails:
this time the entailment does go the other way. The former statement, presenting us with just the constituents of the proposition under analysis, we shall call the "list proposition", the latter the "non-list proposition". Notice that the "list proposition" expresses neither:
(i) the fact of the relation D being (in the proposition analyzed) connected with a and b, nor (ii) the fact of the relation D being connected with a and b in the order in which such items occur in the proposition analyzed, nor (iii) the fact of the relation D occurring (in the proposition analyzed) as a relating relation, and not as a term.
The non-list proposition, with its addition of "Rz (x, yz )", expresses all of these. And this means it will be logically equivalent to "Dz (a, bz )", or that
. Now, upon interpreting the above "Dz " as a universalz relation of diTerence, there is no question about this distinction between "list" and "nonlist" propositions. It is clearly a needed distinction. However, what happens if we interpret "Dz " as the speciWc relation the-diTerence-between-aand-b, letting "D ab " stand for that relation? Does this latter interpretation dissolve the list/non-list distinction? Does the very description of the relation D ab make the phrase "Rz z (x, yz )" unnecessary? To think that "Rz (x, yz )" is not needed when Rz is a speciWc relation is a mistake.
And, to see why, recall what was "missing" when we compared the list with the non-list proposition. Crucial here is (iii). For while this description of "D ab " (the-diTerence-between-a-and-bz ) may provide both what the relation relates (see (i) above for the items it relates), as well as the order of that connection (see (ii) above for the order of that relation), it does not supply us with (iii): the fact of the relation D ab occurring in the proposition under analysis as a relating relation, and not as a term in the initial proposition. For, as we have noted, a speciWc relation can occur in a proposition in which it relates, as well as others in which it is related. The need for "Rz (x, yz )", which tells us that-in the proposition under analysis-D ab is relating and not related, is thus never eliminated. In neither case-universal or speciWc-does our list proposition entail the non-list proposition. This similarity will prove useful in understanding the problem of reconstitution we will soon see in the Principles.
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Later, in the Principlesz and elsewhere, Russell himself advances a number of arguments against his earlier position in ddd. We shall here discuss four things: Wrst, Russell discovering why at least one relating relation must be characterized as universal; second, Russell coming to see that it is not some inWnite regress that is "harmful" to a proposition's meaning; third, Russell noting that a proposition's constituents never "reconstitute" that original proposition; and, fourth, Russell's own vocabulary of deWnite descriptions providing a framework for understanding his Wnal abandonment of the argument for speciWc relations found in ddd.
Russell's response toz ddd's conclusion ddd had shown that "all" relations are speciWc. In the Principles, Russell argues that this is not the case. There he argues that even if relations like diTerence are speciWc ("particularized"), and thus diTerent, there must-for relations alike in kind-be some sense in which they are still the same. In the Principles, he says that the "way in which two terms can have anything in common is by both having a given relation to a given term" (p. 51; emphasis added). For Russell, two speciWc relations of diTerence, say, Dz ab and Dz cd , can be said to be of the same kindz when each bears the instance-of relation to the common class-concept of DiTerence-each is a DiTerence. However, Russell here realizes that if this instance-of relation is itself particularized, then the relations, Dz ab and Dz cd , would not have the needed "given relation to a given term", and, as a result, they would not be of the same kind. As Russell puts it above: they would not "have anything in common". So, against this possibility, he sees that at least the instance-of relation must be shareable, and thus could not be a relation speciWc to its terms. In the Principles, he says: "The relation of an instance to its universal … must be … numerically the same in all cases where it occurs" (p. 52n.). This also conWrmed for Russell that the reasoning in ddd was somehow at fault, since it had "shown" that all relations are speciWc.
Russell's response toz ddd's argument against universal relations
Russell began with the basic notion of a proposition. Such entities have meaning. In ddd he presented a comparison of regresses, in which the harmful regress involving meaning seemed to occur with a universal relation, but not with a speciWc relation. This was partly a result of "the meaning" of a proposition initially being grounded in a single constituent of that proposition (the predicate or the relation). When this notion of meaning changes into a feature of a proposition as a whole, the comparison of regresses also changes. With such a change, Russell believes that no analysis will be "harmless", since in the Principles he notes that an analysis yields only a list, which itself will lose the proposition's unity and thereby its meaning. Russell in the Principles states that: "A proposition … is essentially a unity, and when analysis has destroyed the unity, no enumeration of constituents will restore the proposition" (p. 50). It seems that, in ddd, Russell insisted on the meaning of the proposition having a unity capable of being located in the predicate (or relation); while in the Principles, he has shifted his focus of concern about the meaning of the proposition to the entire proposition. Though regresses will still occur, they will not be "harmful" to the proposition's meaning: … when a relation holds between two terms, the relations of the relation to the terms, and of these relations to the relation and the terms, and so on ad inWnitum, though all implied by the proposition aUrming the original relation, form no part of the meaningz of this proposition.
(PoM, p. 51; 2nd emphasis added)
These regresses are simply a list of propositions, the nz th always implying (or equivalent to) the (nz +1)th, as harmless as "Pz ", "Pz v Pz ", "Pz v Pz v Pz ", etc. Russell now believes that it is not an inWnite regress, but rather the very analysis of the initial proposition, that is "harmful" to that proposition's meaning. The analysis of a proposition always yields a list not equivalent to the proposition, thus bringing about the "harm".
Russell's response toz ddd's argument for speciWc relations As a result of the above, Russell saw that the problem he had once considered "solved" by the selection of speciWc over universal relations was not really solved at all. Russell will now say that the "problem" is not with the kind of relation a proposition has, speciWc or universal, but rather with the fact that a unity (the proposition) has been analyzed as some set (the proposition's constituent parts), thereby losing that very unity which is essential for its being meaningful. And, by the time Russell wrote the Principles, he was aware that such a loss would happen with either kind of relation he had been considering in ddd. As he said in the Principlesz : … even if the diTerence of A and Bz be absolutely peculiar to A and B, still the three terms A, B, diTerence of A from B, do not reconstitute the proposition 'A diTers from Bz', any more than A and Bz and diTerence did.
(P. 51)
We can take this "reconstitution problem" to be Russell's way of putting what we said at the end of our last section, viz., that the distinction between what we called the list and the non-list propositions would hold regardless of whether the relation is taken to be speciWc or universal. For in neither case would the "list-proposition" be logically equivalent to (or, as Russell above puts it, "reconstitute") the original proposition under analysis. In this failure to "reconstitute", universal and speciWc relations are similar. So, while the speciWc relation is diTerent from the universal in that it may be unique to the proposition under analysis, this is no longer suUcient for Russell. The claim of ddd that this role-the ability 8 Since this paper is not a history of the development of the Russell's theory of denotation, though we may use some of its vocabulary here, we are not claiming that this full theory was already on Russell's mind. 9 The sentence is "altered" just to avoid the awkward side of the original question. 10 We have chosen "proposition" and not "fact" because of the language Russell employs about this time.
to reconstitute-provides a signiWcant advantage to speciWc over universal relations can no longer be recognized.
Russell's response to his concern
Russell's own later Theory of DeWnite Descriptions will provide a framework for understanding this issue. By his theory we mean, of course, taking sentences like "The Fz is Gz z " and treating them as of the form "There is exactly one Fz and it is G." In this sentence, the "The Fy" part is called "the deWnite description". 8 Now let us begin ddd all over again, slightly altering its opening question:
9 "Does the diTerence of A and Bz diTer from the diTerence of Cz and Dz ?" We now can show that, when writing ddd, Russell did not see the ambiguity in the very question he was asking. For now, using the vocabulary of deWnite descriptions, we may take this question to be actually one of two quite diTerent questions. Let us look at each of these.
Question Xz : First, in asking the above, we could be asking if these are diTerent:
1. The proposition that A is diTerent from B. Here we have a case of two deWnite descriptions. Since the descriptions are of propositions and propositions are determined by their content, the items described must be diTerent from each other. Analogous to such a case would be: "the number that is successor of 11", and "the number that is successor of 15". For this is also a clear case of diTerent deWnite descriptions, diTerent things described.
Question Yz : Or, we could be asking if these are diTerent:
1. The relation of diTerence thatz is had by A and B.
2. The relation of diTerence thatz is had by C and D.
that assumption, by Wnally seeing that such phrases as "the diTerence of A and Bz " and "the diTerence of C and Dz" could at least be interpreted as the propositions "that A is diTerent from Bz " and "that C is diTerent from Dz " (see question Xz z ) and not as relations. As Russell puts it:
The diTerence of x and y [a and bz] is the proposition "xy0'yz" ["Dzz(a, bz)"], and this is a diVerent proposition from "z 0'w" ["Dzz(c, dy) Along with this, Russell Wnally sees that phrases like "Relation Rz between a and bz " can be read as a version of what question Yz is concerned with, that is, even though the descriptions under question Yz were two in number, there did not have to be two items picked out. Thus, even though the Relation R between a andz b, and the Relation R between c and d might indeed involve diTerent deWnite descriptions, there is nothing in that fact which forces one to claim there are two (diTerent) relations that are being talked about. In his long work on Meinong, Russell said that there is "a relation R, and there are terms a and bz z ; but if R relates a and b, then 'Relation Rz between a and bz ' is simply the relation Rz … with a reminder that a and bz are related by it" (Papers 4: 470). And, as a result of this, Russell now holds that there need be "no relation particularized by its terms" (ibid.). As previously mentioned, the very question introducing Russell's ddd line of thought can no longer be seen as a single question. So, the possibility of getting a single answer from "it" is gone.
In his Meinong work, Russell again brings in what he calls "particularized relations"-but there in an attempt to account for a relational 11 See my "Russell on Particularized Relations", Russell 3 (1983): 138-43, for a brief outline of this (failed) attempt.
12 I want to thank Mike Slosarz and David Annis for their helpful comments during various stages of this work.
proposition's truth, not its meaning. The diTerent role this entity now plays-acting like a fact-is an entirely diTerent story.
11 For Russell, however, those past arguments in ddd for particularization have vanished.
